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Abstract
Water quality trading schemes in the United States can predominantly be character-
ized by low trading volumes. In this paper we utilize laboratory economics experiments
to explore the extent to which the technology through which pollution abatement is
achieved inuences market outcomes. Mirroring the majority of water quality trading
markets, the sessions utilize small trading groups composed of six participants. To
understand the extent to which abatement technology inuences trading behavior, the
experimental treatments vary the degree of heterogeneity in initial abatement costs and
the potential for long-lived investments in cost-reducing abatement technology.
1 Introduction
Although the number of water quality trading schemes has increased substantially over the
last two decades, nearly all active trading programs to date have been characterized by low
trading volumes. Data from a comprehensive summary by Breetz et al. (2004) highlights
over seventy proposed or active water quality trading programs in the United States, many
of which are still under development. Of the nineteen active trading programs only four had
experienced more than three trades (Morgan and Wolverton 2005). A more recent worldwide
study of twenty six active trading programs by the World Resources Institute (Selman et
al. 2009) found that only two programs, the Long Island Sound Nitrogen Credit Exchange
Program in Connecticut and the Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme in Australia, have
exhibited continuous trading activity since their inception.
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2In this paper we utilize laboratory economics experiments to investigate the role of tech-
nological impediments to active emission credit trading. Mimicking the realities of most
point-source water quality markets, our setup features a market composed of a small number
of participants for which pollution reductions are realized through a combination of con-
tinuous, variable cost abatement and discrete capital investments in improved abatement
technology. The consideration of both variable and xed costs is a divergence from textbook
examples pollution trading, which focus only on 'short-run' marginal cost trading in robust
markets. Reecting this focus, the majority of previous pollution trading experiments in
the literature have ignored the role of xed-cost, capital investments and long-run decision
making.
Elsewhere, it has been argued that the limited number of observed trades in actual water
quality markets can be attributed to a lack of a binding cap on emissions (Selman et al.
2009), lack of regulatory coverage (Faeth 2006), or imposed market structures (Woodward
and co-authors 2002a, b; 2003). Individual water treatment plants may choose to over-comply
and not trade due to demographic pressures (Earnhart 2004a, b), to allow for a margin of
safety to account for variability in hydrological and other conditions (Bandyopadhyay and
Horowitz 2006), or to protect opportunities for future growth (Hamstead and BenDor 2010).
While there are undoubtedly a number of reasons for the observed lack of trading, our
experiments focus on the existence of discrete capital costs and a limited number of traders
as contributing factors. Both of these issues were recently raised in a study of municipal
wastewater treatment plants in the Upper Passaic Watershed, N.J. (Sado, Boisvert and Poe
2010).
With relatively thin markets in specic watersheds, we conjecture that three interrelated
technological features strongly impede trading. First, wastewater treatment technologies are
relatively homogeneous, being limited to well-established chemical or biological treatment
methods. Ceteris paribus, such homogeneity limits the gains that can be realized from trad-
ing. Second, most regulated rms cannot achieve the required pollution standard given their
current abatement technology. In small markets, rms that do not upgrade may thus be sub-
jected to monopoly powers by sellers or face a substantial penalty for noncompliance. Third,
to achieve large scale emissions reductions, rms must make long-lived capital investments
to upgrade their abatement technology. Hence, cost savings and trading opportunities are
conditional on the allocation of investments across rms. These features are consistent with
the observed overcapitalization in watersheds with trading programs (Hamstead and Ben-
Dor, 2010), with too many rms investing in costly abatement technology and the absence of
cost-saving trading activity. More generally this combination of features raises questions on
the extent to which standard market trading can optimally allocate capital investment costs
3across traders.
An empirical analysis of active trading programs could provide insight into the challenges
associated with thin markets and lumpy investments; however the overall lack of trades
across nearly all trading programs makes this type of analysis dicult. We therefore turn to
the experimental laboratory to provide feedback on the relative severity of the impediments
described above. In the experiments, markets are composed of six participants that take on
the role of point source emitters. Participants decide whether to pay the xed cost necessary
to upgrade to a technology that reduces their costs of abatement, which if adopted remains
in place for the duration of the trial. Following the technology decision, participants choose
a level of abatement and participate in a double auction where pollution credits can be
purchased and sold.
While the experiments are primarily motivated by water quality trading, the results may
also be relevant to on other trading scenarios characterized by thin markets and xed costs
associated with long-lived abatement technologies. A better understanding of the causes of
ineciencies in such markets will then allow for the development of improved trading regimes
that allow buyers and sellers to better coordinate their capital decision making.
2 Relevant literature
In this section, we review several economic studies that utilize data from experiments that
incorporate discrete "technology" choices in a pollution credit trading framework.
The most relevant studies in this literature come from Ben-David et al. (1999; 2000)
who implement experiments that replicate features of the SO2 permit trading market to
investigate the role of rm abatement cost heterogeneity. In the experiments, participants
have an opportunity to choose between three irreversible abatement technologies after each
trading period. Although including a technology decision makes these studies similar to our
experiments, the technology investment itself is not a treatment variable. The authors instead
focus their analysis on the inuence of rm heterogeneity, uncertainty, and price dispersion
on observed social eciency. The authors nd that increased cost-function heterogeneity
reduces trade volume and eciency. They also nd that uncertainty does not inuence trade
volume or prices, potentially because participants use a "wait and see" strategy before making
irreversible investments.
Two additional studies also investigate the eect of investment decisions on outcomes
in emissions trading markets. A study by Camacho-Cuena, Requate and Waichman (2010)
explores how the type of permit auction (ascending clock and double auction) inuences
investment and abatement decisions. The authors nd that the "cleanest" rms tend to
4over-invest in abatement technology while the "dirtiest" rms tend to under-invest and that
this is invariant to the type of auction mechanism. Experiments by Gangadharan, Farrell
and Croson (forthcoming) explore permit banking behavior when rms have an opportunity
to make investments in abatement technology. In one treatment, participants can make a
one-time investment that allows them to produce goods more eciently for the remainder of
the treatment. The authors observe signicant overinvestment in technology and overbanking
relative to ecient levels. Importantly, the authors nd that the combination of investment
opportunities and banking lead to the most inecient outcomes.
3 Theory
The theoretical model is motivated by the regulation of wastewater treatment facilities oper-
ating in a relatively small watershed. In this section we introduce both the social planner's
problem and the problem faced by individual rms seeking to reduce emissions at least cost.
To begin, assume that n rms are operating in a watershed and that each rm accepts the
waste of households and converts the waste into euent, which enters a common waterway.
It is assumed that the quantity of waste that a rm accepts is not a choice variable and does
not inuence the concentration of pollution in the euent. The concentration of pollution in
a rm's euent, hereafter referred to as "emissions", is determined by the level of abatement
eort that the rm engages in. The choice variable for rm i therefore is its level of abatement,
ai, which is related to its level of emissions, ei, by the function ai = e0
i   ei, where e0
i is the
status quo level of emissions for the rm.
The variable cost of abatement for rm i is determined by the function Cil(ai). The
subscript l represents the particular abatement technology employed by rm i and we assume
that l = f1;2g. For each technology type, Cil(0) = 0 and it is further assumed that C0
il(ai) > 0
and C00
il(ai) > 0. To upgrade from technology l = 1 to technology l = 2 a rm must incur
a xed cost, K. The nal assumption is that Ci1(ai)  Ci2(ai) for all given values of ai,
which implies that the variable cost of abatement is higher with technology 1 compared to
technology 2.
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where Ii is an indicator variable that is equal to one if rm i upgrades to l = 2 and zero
otherwise and  represents the time period in which rm i upgrades. Solving the social
planner's problem is challenging because of the discrete nature of the technology decision.
Although a closed form solution to the mixed integer program above cannot be dened,
the proposition below is based on the theoretical model.
Proposition 1 If it is socially optimal for at least one rm to upgrade, it is always optimal
for the upgrade to occur in period zero.
Proof of Proposition 1 Without loss of generality, assume that n = 1 and T = 1. If the
rm does not upgrade in either period, the present value of their costs across the two periods
will be D = C01 + C11, where the rst term in the subscript is the period (0 or 1) and the
second term is the technology (1 or 2). If the rm upgrades in period zero, their discounted
costs are E = K + C02 + C12. Finally, if the rm upgrades in period one, their discounted
costs become F = C01 + K + C12.
Now, suppose that it is optimal for the rm to upgrade in period one. Then it must be
the case that F < Min(D;E). From the condition that F < D we get that K < C11   C12.
From the condition that F < E we get that K > 1
1 (C01   C02). However this brings
us to a contradiction, since it is not possible for C11   C12 > 1
1 (C01   C02) given that
C11   C12 = C01   C02.
In theory, a simple emissions permit trading system could induce optimal upgrade and
abatement choices in which some rms upgrade their technology and sell permits to the re-
maining rms that do not undertake costly upgrades. With a small number of rms operating
in a particular watershed, however, there is a great deal of coordination required to induce
optimal investment. For example, if the penalty for noncompliance is high enough rms may
be unwilling to take a chance that there will be sucient permits for sale for them to achieve
the emissions standard. The result would be overcapitalization, where too many rms engage
in costly upgrades.
















i   ait)) (2)
s.t. e
0
i   ait  Wit + mit   yit 8 t = 0;:::;T:
where mit represents the number of permits purchased by rm i and yit is the number of
permits sold by rm i. When equation (2) is summed across the n rms in the watershed,
the result is equivalent to the social planner's problem in equation (1). This equivalence
depends on the assumption that
Pn
i=1 W = G and that
Pn
i=1[Wit   (e0
i   ait)] = 0 in each
time period.
Despite the functional equivalence, individual upgrade decisions may diverge from social
eciency under the permit trading policy for a number of reasons. The most obvious cause
for a divergence stems from the fact that the price and availability of future permits is not
known with certainty prior to rms making their upgrade decisions. Firms that are risk averse
may upgrade rather than subject themselves to the chance that the price of permits will be
excessively high or not available at all. Further, if there is a limitation on the quantity of
abatement that rms with technology 1 are able to undertake, there is a risk that the supply
of permits available at any price will be insucient for them to meet the permit constraint
unless they upgrade.
While uncertainty with respect to the price and supply of permits may lead to excessive
upgrades, there is also an option value associated with waiting to upgrade that stems from
the irreversible nature of the investment decision. In other words, there is a benet to a rm
associated with waiting to observe the number of rms that upgrade, since the number of
rms that upgrade will inuence the market price of permits. By not upgrading in period
zero, a rm preserves its ability to upgrade in future periods when it can observe the number
of other rms that upgrade and have a more accurate estimate of the price of permits. Finally,
upgrade and abatement decisions may diverge from social eciency if the discount rates of
individual rms are dierent from the rate used by the social planner.
4 Experiment setup
To investigate the potential for a permit trading system to induce least cost upgrade and
abatement behavior, we conduct a series of laboratory economics experiments to simulate
the market environment described above. In this section we begin by outlining the baseline
experimental setup and then describe the experimental treatments that are implemented.
7Although we discuss the setup here with an environmental context, the instructions for the
experiment (included in the appendix) are framed neutrally.
In the experiment, participants are randomly and anonymously placed into groups of six
(n = 6). Each participant has one of two abatement cost functions, either "Type A" or
"Type B". The marginal cost of abatement for Type A is dened as MCi1(ai) = a3
i while
the marginal cost of abatement for Type B is MCi2(ai) = a2
i. Therefore, abatement is more
costly for Type A participants than it is for Type B participants. Abatement units are dened
discretely on the interval f0,8g and tokens are used as the currency within the experiment,
which are exchanged for US Dollars at a rate of 200 tokens = 1 US Dollar.
Each experimental session consists of two distinct stages. Stage one implements a baseline
scenario that is identical across all treatments and allows participants to become familiar with
the trading framework. In each stage one round, participants are randomly assigned either
Type A or Type B abatement costs. Participants undertake two practice rounds where there
are 3 Type A and 3 Type B participants. There are then ve actual rounds, and across the
ve rounds there are 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 Type A participants (and the corresponding number
of Type B participants), in random order.
In stage two of the experiment, participants undertake one ve-round practice trial and
then three actual ve-round trials. The groups of six are reshued prior to the beginning of
each of the trials. The trials in stage two of each session implement one of four treatment
scenarios described below. The same treatment is played in each of the three actual trials
within each session.
The social objective in each round is to reduce pollution from the status quo (zero abate-
ment) of 48 to a target of 24. To achieve the desired reduction, a permit trading program
is implemented wherein four permits are distributed to each of the six rms and each per-
mit allows the rm to emit one unit. The permits are fully transferable, so that a rm can
choose to emit fewer than four units and sell permits to rms that emit more than four units.
Permits cannot be banked for use in future rounds.
The transfer of permits occurs in each round through a standard double auction mecha-
nism. In the double auction, rms submit bids to purchase permits and oers to sell permits.
Trades are consummated whenever a participant chooses to buy a permit for a price that has
been oered or chooses to sell a permit for the highest posted bid price. Note that although
it is possible for any given rm to be either a seller or a buyer of permits, it is socially optimal
for Type A participants to be buyers of permits from Type B participants.
84.1 Treatments
The four treatments that are implemented vary the initial number of rms with upgraded
technology, the maximum abatement possible for Type A rms, and the potential for rms
Type A rms to upgrade. Treatment 1 serves as a baseline and implements a scenario with
4 Type A participants and 2 Type B participants. In this treatment, rms cannot upgrade
and the objective of the treatment is to ensure that with cost function heterogeneity, rms
are able to meet the pollution objective at least cost.
In treatment 2 there are again 4 Type A participants and 2 Type B participants at the
beginning of each trial. In this treatment, however, Type A participants can upgrade to Type
B at any point in the trial. To upgrade to Type B, a participant must pay a xed cost of 400
tokens (K = 400). The abatement technologies are long-lived, so once the upgrade occurs
the participant is Type B for the remaining rounds in the trial. This treatment provides
a simple test of the extent to which the choice of technology inuences permit prices and
trading volumes.
Treatment 3 implements a scenario where, at the beginning of each trial, there are 6 Type
A and 0 Type B participants and participants can upgrade at any time. This treatment is
meant to test the extent to which inecient upgrade behavior is a function of coordination
challenges on the part of participants. Finally, in treatment 4 there are initially 6 Type A and
0 Type B participants, participants can upgrade at any time, and Type A participants can
only abate three units of pollution without upgrading to Type B. This allows us to measure
the extent to which technological constraints inuence trading behavior. For example, rms
may choose to undertake costly upgrades to eliminate the possibility that there will not be a
sucient supply of permits for them to purchase on the open market. Table 1 below provides
a summary of the treatments described above.
Table 1: Treatment summary
Initial # rms Initial # rms Can rms Do rms face
with tech. 1 with tech. 2 upgrade? limited abatement?
Treatment 1 4 2 No No
Treatment 2 4 2 Yes No
Treatment 3 6 0 Yes No
Treatment 4 6 0 Yes Yes
To implement the limited abatement treatment, we assume that if Type A rms do not
acquire at least one permit (to bring them up to a total of ve permits), then they will face a
penalty of 300 tokens for every permit less than ve that they hold. In other words, they pay
the abatement costs associated with abating 3 units (36 tokens) and must pay an additional
9300 tokens per permit below ve that they hold.
4.2 Cost Scenarios
This section utilizes the parameterization employed in the experimental sessions to calculate
the total costs of achieving the pollution standard and the individual incentives facing par-
ticipants. To begin, we calculate the cost minimizing abatement choices necessary to achieve
the pollution standard, contingent on the number of rms that upgrade. This is done by
comparing the marginal costs of abatement for the rms that upgrade and those that do not.
Variable costs are calculated by summing the marginal costs of abatement, starting from
the lowest marginal cost units and proceeding until the standard is met. All upgrades are
assumed to occur in the rst round.
As an example, suppose three rms upgrade in round one. The rms that upgrade will
optimally abate ve units while the three rms that do not upgrade optimally abate two units.
The sum of the abatement costs across the six rms and the ve rounds of the experiment
are equal to 1,365 while the xed cost of the three rms that upgrade is 1,200. This implies
that the minimum total cost for the six rms over ve rounds is equal to 2,565 if three rms
upgrade. Table 2 enumerates the minimum total cost of abatement contingent on the number
of rms that upgrade.
Table 2: Comparison of compliance costs
Tech. 1 Units abated Tech. 2 Units abated Variable Fixed Total
rms per rm rms per rm cost cost cost
6 4 0 - 3000 0 3000
5 3 (x3) 4 (x2) 1 7 2240 400 2640
4 3 2 6 1630 800 2430
3 3 3 5 1365 1200 2565
2 2 4 5 1190 1600 2790
1 2 5 4 (x3) 5 (x2) 1045 2000 3045
0 - 6 4 900 2400 3300
Based on the results in table 2, the cost minimizing means of abating 24 units in each of
the ve rounds is for two rms to upgrade to Type B in round one and abate six units, while
the four rms that do not upgrade abate three units. The table provides a measure of the
potential ineciency associated with the upgrade decisions. For example, even if abatement
decisions are made optimally, the total costs of achieving the pollution standard if all six
rms upgrade will be more than 35% higher than if two rms upgrade.
The cost minimizing solution does not vary across treatments, which allows for relatively
easy eciency comparisons. Although table 2 focuses on the upgrade decision, ineciency
10can enter in three ways; (1) More or fewer than two rms upgrade, (2) Firms that upgrade
do not upgrade in round one, (3) Firms make inecient abatement choices contingent on the
number of rms that upgrade.
As an example of the costs of inecient abatement choices, suppose that two rms upgrade
in round one (optimal upgrade behavior). Instead of the rms that upgrade abating six units
and the remaining rms abating three units, suppose that all rms abate four units in each
round. The total xed costs obviously remain the same, but the variable costs across the
ve rounds increase from 1,630 to 2,300. The total costs of abatement in this case therefore
increase by nearly 30%.
An individual rm-decision maker will weigh the costs to the potential benets of up-
grading. If the rm ignores the potential for trades to occur and simply makes the upgrade
decision by comparing the reduction in variable costs to the xed cost, then it would never
choose to upgrade. The total variable costs to a rm of not upgrading and abating four units
in each of the ve rounds is 500 tokens. The total variable cost to a rm that upgrades is 150
tokens. Given the 400 token xed cost of upgrading the total cost of upgrading is 50 units
higher than not upgrading.
The number of permits that are transacted and the expected price of the traded permits
are a function of the number of rms that upgrade to Type B. The exact price of the permits
that are transacted cannot be predicted with precision, but will instead depend on bargaining
between rms. In the table below, we provide the theoretical minimum and maximum price
of permits contingent on the number of rms that upgrade.
The predicted number of units abated by each rm is determined by ranking the marginal
cost of abatement of all rms from lowest to highest. Units are abated starting from the lowest
marginal cost and continuing until the standard is achieved. The minimum permit price is
then equal to the highest marginal cost among the units abated (i.e., the last unit abated).
If the price were to go below this point, then the rm would prefer to purchase an additional
permit rather than abate that unit and the demand for permits would be greater than the
supply. The maximum price is equal to the marginal cost of the rst unit that is not abated.
If the price were to exceed this level, then the rm would prefer to abate that unit and the
supply of permits would be greater than the demand.
As expected, table 3 reveals that both the minimum and maximum price decrease as the
number of rms that upgrade increases. To illustrate how the benets of upgrading depend
on the number of rms that upgrade, we compare the costs to a rm when it is the only
rm that upgrades to the costs to an upgraded rm when ve rms upgrade. In the case
where only one rm upgrades, the variable cost of abatement, plus the xed cost, minus the
revenue from the sale of permits is 140 tokens. For the rms that do not upgrade, the cost
11Table 3: Predicted permit prices
# of rms # of Permits Minimum Maximum
that upgrade transacted per round price price
0 0 - -
1 3-4 64 64
2 4 36 49
3 3 27 36
4 4 25 36
5 2 25 25
6 0 - -
of abatement, plus the cost of permits is 500 tokens. When ve rms upgrade, the cost of
abatement, plus the xed cost, minus the revenue from permit sales for a rm that upgrades
is 675 tokens. This is compared to the total cost to the rm that does not upgrade of 295.
5 Results
The experimental sessions were completed at the Cleve E. Willis Experimental Economics
Laboratory at the University of Massachusetts Amherst in the Spring of 2011. Each of the
four treatments were completed in one session with 24 undergraduate participants, making
the total number of participants equal to 96. In this section we summarize the results from
the sessions by focusing on four linked outcomes of interest; upgrade behavior, transaction
volume, transaction prices, and cost eectiveness.
5.1 Upgrade behavior
In each of the four treatments, the cost-minimizing outcome requires four type A and two
type B participants. Further, to minimize costs, all upgrades must occur prior to the rst
of the ve trading rounds. Treatment 1 implements the optimal upgrade scenario with two
type B participants and does not allow further upgrades. Table 4 below provides the average
number of observed type B participants across the four groups and three trials by treatment
in each of the ve rounds.
The results in Table 4 illustrate three clear outcomes. First, in each of the three treatments
where participants are able to upgrade, the number of upgrades exceed the cost-minimizing
level of two even in the rst round (p < 0.025 in each case). The second result from Table 4
is that the initial number of type B participants and whether or not the type A participants
have limited abatement potential does not have a signicant impact on upgrade behavior.
There are no signicant dierences in the number of type B participants across the three
12Table 4: Mean number of upgrades by treatment and round
Treatment 2 (S.E.) Treatment 3 (S.E.) Treatment 4 (S.E.)
Round 1 3.33 (0.139) 2.92 (0.215) 2.92 (0.547)
Round 2 3.50 (0.220) 3.33 (0.241) 3.25 (0.449)
Round 3 3.58 (0.163) 3.50 (0.220) 3.50 (0.531)
Round 4 3.67 (0.241) 3.50 (0.220) 3.50 (0.531)
Round 5 3.67 (0.241) 3.50 (0.220) 3.58 (0.510)
N 300
R2 0.632
treatments in any of the ve rounds.
The third result related to upgrade behavior is that there is a small but signicant increase
in the number of type B participants between the rst round and the fth round. Across the
three treatments there is an average increase of 0.5 in the number of type B participants.
This suggests that there is some additional ineciency that enters from rms choosing to
upgrade after the rst round.
In addition to exploring treatment eects, we also investigate the role that individual
participant characteristics have on upgrade decisions. To accomplish this, we utilize two
additional sources of information. First, we implement a post session questionnaire, which
collects demographic and scholastic information from each participant. Second, we have each
participant undertake a standard post-session risk preference test. We provided real nancial
incentives for participants by paying two subjects in each session based on the role of a die,
which indicated the payo scenario that they would be compensated for.
The results from the individual-level upgrade decision model is provided below in table
5. The dependent variable in the model is simply a binary outcome of whether or not the
participant has chosen to upgrade by the end of the trial. Given that there are three trials
in each session, the standard errors are clustered by subject. We utilize a simple linear
probability model for ease of interpretation, as the coecients represent how a particular
characteristic inuences a participant's probability of upgrading.
The participant-level results reveal some interesting characteristics that play a role in
upgrade behavior. The starkest results are for year in school and gender. Freshmen are 57%
more likely than seniors to upgrade from type A to type B, while female participants are
21% more likely to upgrade than their male counterparts. Interestingly, risk preference also
inuences upgrade decisions, while the number of economics classes and the number of prior
experiments that a participant has undertaken do not have a signicant inuence. Based on
the results, risk aversion is negatively correlated with decisions to upgrade. It appears that
13Table 5: Upgrade decision- individual eects model





# of econ classes -0.008 (0.009)
# of previous experiments 0.023 (0.023)





participants perceive the decision to upgrade decision as risky. This story could reasonably
be told both ways. Upgrading to type B reduces the risk of high prices in the permit market.
Upgrading is, however, risky in that participants must pay a high xed amount and hope
that there will be a sucient number of buyers to allow them to recoup their investment in
the lower variable cost technology.
5.2 Transaction volume
Based on the observed low numbers of actual transactions in most water quality trading
markets, one motivation for the experimental design is to better understand the degree to
which available abatement technologies inuence transaction volumes. The predicted number
of transactions in the experiment is a function of the number of participants that choose to
upgrade, as shown in Table 3. If none of the participants choose to upgrade or if all of them
upgrade, then there should not be any transactions, as abatement costs are homogeneous and
there are no gains from trade. If fewer than ve participants upgrade then there should be,
at most, four permits transacted. Finally, if ve of the six participants choose to upgrade,
then there should be two permits that transact.
Table 5 provides the mean number of transactions per round in each of the treatments.
The results appear to reveal a treatment eect on transactions, as the number of transactions
in treatment 3 is signicantly higher than in treatment 2. This apparent treatment eect,
however, is likely caused by the idiosyncratic dierences in participant behavior across the
two treatments rather than a true treatment eect. Evidence for this assertion comes from
the fact that the number of transactions in treatment 3 is also signicantly higher than in
treatment 2 in Part A of the experiment, where the scenarios are identical.
14Table 6: Transaction volume
Coecient (Std. Err.)
Treatment 1 6.48 (0.496)
Treatment 2 4.68 (0.637)
Treatment 3 7.20 (0.525)
Treatment 4 5.52 (0.740)
N 240
R2 0.883
A second important observation from Table 5 is the total number of transactions that take
place. Across the four treatments there are nearly six transactions per round on average,
which is a 50% higher volume than is predicted by theory under even the most favorable
trading conditions. This surprising result suggests that participants were attempting to gain
extra revenue by engaging in arbitrage, even when few arbitrage opportunities exist. Indeed,
participants both bought and sold permits in 28% of the rounds in Part B of the experiment.
Allowing participants to both buy and sell in the same round is a design component that
we ultimately decided to allow because we assumed that it would help rationalize the market.
Surprisingly, participants seeking arbitrage opportunities did not alter their strategies over
time, as the number of transactions does not signicantly diminish over rounds.
To get a better idea for what may be driving these "arbitragers" we regress the number
of transactions made by round on the same set of participant information used in Table 4
above. The results presented in Table 6 suggest that experience may play a role in participant
behavior. Both the number of previous experiments that a participant has undertaken in the
past and to a lesser extent the number of economics classes that a participant has taken
reduce the number of observed transactions.
5.3 Prices
The observed transaction prices from the experimental sessions reveal important information
about the eect of upgrade decisions on market outcomes. The greater the number of partic-
ipants that choose to upgrade, the greater the supply of permits on the market and the lower
the predicted price at which permits transact. In addition, observed market prices provide
a basis for participants in making future upgrade decisions. If permit prices are relatively
high, this suggests higher gains associated with upgrading and becoming seller of permits.
The mean prices presented in Table 8 reveal three outcomes of interest. First, in each of
the treatments there is an inverse relationship between the number of type B participants and
the mean price at which permits trade. This result is in line with predictions and reinforces
15Table 7: Transaction volume model, individual eects





# of econ classes -0.032* (0.018)
# of previous experiments -0.122** (0.041)





Table 8: Mean prices by treatment and number of type B participants
# Type B Tr 1 (S.E.) Tr 2 (S.E.) Tr 3 (S.E.) Tr 4 (S.E.)
2 48.79 (3.21) 48.00 (24.87) 48.54 (6.90) 70.09 (7.18)
3 - - 39.01 (4.79) 44.24 (5.86) 54.49 (5.30)
4 - - 32.96 (4.54) 34.57 (5.08) 42.56 (6.65)




16the idea that the returns to upgrading diminish with the number of participants that have
already upgraded.
The second outcome of interest from the transaction prices is that in treatments 1 - 3
mean prices, conditional on the number of Type B participants, are not statistically dierent.
The prices fall in the upper range or slightly above the theoretical predictions made in Table
3. Despite this outcome, prices in treatments 2 and 3 are not high enough to provide an
explanation for the excessive number of upgrades that are observed. It can be shown that
when there are two type B participants, a participant with type A can only recoup the xed
cost of upgrading if the price of permits is at least 50 tokens. Mean prices never exceed 50
in treatments 2 and 3, although the dierence is not large.
The nal outcome of interest with respect to prices is that prices in treatment four are
signicantly higher than prices in the rst three treatments when there are only 2 or 3 type B
participants. Recall that in treatment 4, type A participants have limited abatement choices
and are penalized if they do not purchase a permit from a type B participant. The threat
of the penalty gives type B participants extra market power and results in higher observed
transaction prices. Prices in Treatment 4 are high enough to explain the excessive number
of upgrades that occur in that treatment.
5.4 Cost eectiveness
Markets for water quality will only be judged as a success if water quality objectives are
achieved and there are realized cost savings associated with trading. In the experiments
that we conduct, water quality objectives are assumed to be achieved and therefore we focus
here on the cost-eectiveness of the market outcomes. Specically, we measure the degree of
ineciency of the observed market outcomes by calculating the percent by which observed











In equation (3), there are two sources of ineciency which additively determine the total
ineciency measure. The variable UpCost in equation (3) represents the cost to the group if
trading is perfectly ecient, conditional on the number of type B participants. The rst com-
ponent in equation (3) therefore represents ineciency stemming from the upgrade decision,
while the second component represents ineciency that results from trading. A separate
component of ineciency for upgrades that occur after the rst round could be included sep-
arately, but late upgrades account for only about a one percent increase in costs and so are
17lumped into the upgrade ineciency measure. As a point of comparison, if there are exactly
two type B participants in the group and no trading occurs, then upgrade ineciency is zero
and trading ineciency is 27.6%.
Table 9: Observed cost ineciency
Ineciency (S.E.) Upgrade Ine. (S.E.) Trade Ine. (S.E.)
Treatment 1 0.237 (0.027) - - 0.237 (0.027)
Treatment 2 0.174 (0.027) 0.118 (0.023) 0.055 (0.011)
Treatment 3 0.300 (0.043) 0.109 (0.017) 0.191 (0.060)
Treatment 4 0.263 (0.038) 0.119 (0.044) 0.144 (0.056)
N 60 60 60
R2 0.514 0.490 0.429
The ineciency results reveal that on average, total costs are nearly 25 percent higher
than the minimum possible cost across the four treatments. Slightly less than half of this
ineciency, in treatments 2 - 4, is a result of the excessive number of upgrades that occur.
The fact that the upgrade ineciency does not vary signicantly across treatments 2 - 4 is not
surprising given that upgrade behavior is nearly identical in these treatments. It is surprising,
however, that there is so much variation in trading ineciency. In the rst treatment, where
there is no potential for upgrades, costs are 23.7% higher than the cost minimizing outcome,
strictly because of inecient trading. In fact, the trade ineciency is not signicantly dif-
ferent from the case where no trading occurs at all. The ineciency associated with trading
is signicantly lower in treatment 2 than in any of the other treatments, although it is not
entirely clear what drives this result. There is an inverse relationship between the volume of
transactions reported in Table 6 and the trading eciency reported above. It appears that
the participants that were bent on engaging in arbitrage served to drive up the cost of the
market outcomes.
6 Discussion
While water quality markets have been advanced as a cost-eective way to achieve water
quality objectives, the market environment is often vary dierent that the textbook examples
on which with trading programs are advocated. With only a few rms operating in the market
(thin) and cost savings largely driven by large capital investments (lumpy), the eciency of
market outcomes is likely to be case specic. To date, only a handful of experiments have
investigated trading in small markets where heterogeneity is largely driven by investment
decisions. In this paper, we present the results of market experiments with groups made up
18of six traders. Importantly, we vary the ability of participants to invest in lower variable cost
technology, the initial number of rms with the lower cost technology, and the nature of the
higher cost technology.
The ndings from our experiments should be seen as a rst step towards understanding
behavior in thin and lumpy markets. Overall we nd a degree of over-condence in upgrade
and trading decisions that permeates all of our treatments. While this was not intended
to be a "bubble" experiment (e.g. Smith et al. 1988), our results appear to exhibit some
of this bubble-type behavior. Investment and trading volume appear to be correlated, at
least in part, to what falls under the category of experience, as the number of upgrades and
the number of trades that a participant undertook was negatively correlated with their class
standing and the number of past economics experiments that they had participated in.
In addition to pervasive over-capitalization and excessive trade volume relative to theo-
retical predictions, we also nd more predictable outcomes with respect to the price at which
the permits transact. Specically, the greater the number of rms with the lower-cost tech-
nology, the lower the mean permit price. Further, mean trading prices are very consistent
across treatments, with the exception of the treatment in which participants with the high
variable cost technology are penalized if they did not purchase at least one permit. In this
treatment, prices are signicantly higher when only two or three participants have chosen to
upgrade to the lower-cost technology, as these participants gain market power.
There are a number of future directions for this research to head. A rst consideration
is the fact that it is unlikely that experienced wastewater treatment plant operators would
engage in excessive attempts at arbitrage. One way to limit arbitrage in the experimental
sessions would be to forbid both buying and selling permits in the same round. Eliminating
speculation might then cause traders to focus more on making only benecial trades. A second
potential direction to explore would be to make the upgrade decision sequential rather than
simultaneous. In the current design the number of participants with the lower cost technology
is a treatment condition, but we could also implement a treatment where participants can
observe the upgrade decisions of other market participants in real time.
The ultimate objective of this research is to improve the cost eectiveness of water quality
trading programs. Therefore using these baseline data, we hope to investigate the role of
institutions in altering upgrade and trading behavior in thin and lumpy markets such as
those that categorize most water quality trading programs.
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This  experiment  is  a  study  of  how  people  make  economic  decisions.  If  you  follow  these 
instructions and make careful decisions, you will earn money that will be paid to you privately in 
cash at the end of the session. The amount you earn will depend both on the decisions that you 
make and the decisions of others. You will also earn a show-up fee of $5. Your earnings will be 
measured in tokens which will be added up over the course of the experiment. At the end of the 
experiment you will be paid in cash at the rate of 200 tokens = $1.  Please do not communicate 
with other participants in the experiment.  If you have questions regarding these instructions, 
raise your hand and a monitor will come by to answer your questions.   
   
In the experiment you will buy and sell coupons over a series of rounds. In each round, you will 
be part of a group made up of six participants. You will not know the identity of the other 
participants in your group. Your earnings in each round are made up of three components, which 
will be described in detail below. In particular, round earnings will be determined as follows: 
 
Round Earnings = Coupon Revenue + Proceeds from Coupon Sales – Cost of Coupon Purchases 
 
Your Coupon Revenue will be determined by the number of coupons that you hold at the end of 
the round.  Each participant will start each round with four coupons and can adjust the number 
of coupons they hold by buying and selling them in a market that will operate over the computer 
network. The details of how to buy and sell coupons will be described shortly. In general, the 
more coupons you hold, the higher your Coupon Revenue. 
 
In each round of the experiment you will be either Type A or Type B.  The Coupon Revenue 
associated with different quantities of coupon holdings is different for Type A and Type B. In 
general, coupon revenue is lower for Type A compared to Type B. The coupon revenue for Type 
A and Type B participants associated with each coupon quantity can be found in the “Coupon 
Revenue Sheet”, which has been provided to you. The sheet also indicates the change in coupon 
revenue that comes from increasing or decreasing your coupon holdings by one coupon. 
 
Prior to the beginning of each trading round, you will be told whether you are Type A or Type B. 
You will also be told the total number of Type A and Type B participants in your group of six. 
An example of the screen indicating your type is provided below in Figure 1.   22 
 
 Figure 1 
 
Buying and Selling Coupons 
Each participant will start each round with four coupons and can adjust their coupon holdings by 
buying and selling them in a market. If you sell coupons your earnings will increase by the sale 
price and if you buy coupons your earnings will decrease by the sale price.  
 
Why might you want to buy a coupon? Remember that your Coupon Revenue increases when 
you hold more coupons. If, for example, you are Type A and currently hold 4 coupons, then your 
current coupon revenue is 150 [all quantities below are in terms of tokens]. If instead you hold 5 
coupons, your coupon revenue will increase to 214. Therefore if you can buy a coupon for less 
than 64 [214 – 150 = 64], it will allow you to increase your earnings for that round. For example, 
if you bought a coupon for 40, your round earnings will increase from 150 to 214 – 40 = 174. 
 
Why might you want to sell a coupon? Suppose that you are Type A and currently hold 6 
coupons.  If  you  sell  a  coupon  then  your  coupon  revenue  will  decrease  from  241  to  214. 
Therefore, if you can sell a coupon for more than 27 [241 – 214 = 27], the sales revenue that you 
gain will exceed the coupon revenue that you lose going from 6 to 5 coupons. For example, if 
you sell a coupon for 50, your round earnings will increase from 241 to 214 + 50 = 264. 
 
In each round you will have 1 minute to make transactions. In a given round it is possible for 
you to both buy coupons and/or sell coupons. Note that coupons cannot be carried over between 
rounds. Figure 2 shows an example of the trading screen.  23 
 
 Figure 2 
 
There are two ways that you can buy coupons. 
1.  Participants interested in buying a coupon can submit bid prices by typing their bid into the 
box on the right side of the screen, and then clicking the “Make bid to buy” button. The bid 
is immediately displayed to all six members of your group in the lower right part of the screen 
labeled “Bids to Buy.” Once a bid is submitted, anyone wishing to sell a coupon at this price 
can accept the bid. Such an acceptance results in an immediate trade at that price. Sellers 
prefer higher prices, so any new bids must be higher than the current highest bid.  
2.    The offer prices from participants interested in selling coupons will be listed in ascending 
order  in  the  “Offers  to  Sell”  section  on  the  left.  In  addition  to  posting  bids  to  buy,  as 
described above, anyone wishing to buy a coupon can accept the lowest offer price by simply 
clicking the “Buy at this price” button on the bottom left of the screen.  
There are also two ways that you can sell coupons. 
1.    Participants interested in selling a coupon can submit offer prices by typing their offer into 
the box on the left side of the screen and then clicking on the “Make offer to sell” button. 
This offer price is immediately displayed to all six members of your group in the lower left 
part of the screen labeled “Offers to Sell.” Once an offer is submitted, anyone wishing to buy 
a coupon at this price can accept the offer. Such an acceptance results in an immediate trade at 24 
 
that price. Buyers prefer lower prices, so any new offers to sell must be lower than the current 
lowest offer.  
2.   Bid prices from participant interested in buying coupons will be listed in descending order in 
the “Bids to Buy” column on the far right. In addition to posting Offers to Sell, as described 
above, anyone wishing to sell a coupon can accept the highest bid price by simply clicking the 
“Sell at this price” button on the bottom of their screen.  
Once a transaction is made, the accepted bid or offer will be displayed in the “Trading prices” 
list in the center of your computer screen. Note that when you buy or sell a coupon, all of your 
previous bids and offers will disappear from the screen. 
 
Round Results  
At the end of the round a summary of the results are provided, as shown in Figure 3. The results 
screen provides information on your earnings for the round as well as the total amount that you 
have earned up to that point in the experiment. Once you have reviewed this information, please 
click “continue” to begin the next round. 
Figure 3 
 
To begin, you will participate in two practice rounds that will allow you to get comfortable 
with the trading software. The practice rounds do not affect your earnings in any way. In 
each of the practice rounds there will be three Type A and three Type B participants. Whether 
you are type A or Type B will be determined randomly by the computer software.  
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After the practice rounds, you will play five actual rounds for real money. The number of Type 
A and Type B participants in your group will be different in each round. You will play rounds 
with 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 Type A participants. The order of these rounds is randomly determined. 
Whether you are Type A or Type B in a given round will also be determined randomly. In each 
round, every participant has an equal probability of being either Type A or Type B. 
 
You will begin the first actual round with earnings equal to the show up fee of 1000 tokens = $5. 
Groups will be randomly shuffled prior to the first actual round and will stay the same for each 
of the five actual rounds. After the fifth round, you will receive additional instructions. 
 
Summary 
  Each participant begins each round with 4 coupons. 
  Your Coupon Revenue increases the more coupons you hold. 
  In each round you will be Type A or Type B with equal probability. 
  Your Round Earnings = Coupon Revenue + Proceeds from Sales – Cost of Purchases. 
  You will play 2 practice rounds and then 5 actual rounds for real money. 
  Prior to the first actual round you will be paired with a new group of six participants. 
 
Quiz: Please circle the correct answer.  
A monitor will come around shortly to check your answers and answer any questions you have.  
 
1.  Suppose that you are Type A. If you hold 3 coupons, what is your coupon revenue for the 
round? 
 
  (a) -191  (b) 25    (c) 150   (d) 195 
 
2.  Suppose that you are Type B and that you hold 4 coupons. By how much will your coupon 
revenue increase if you acquire a fifth coupon? 
 
  (a) 16  (b) 64    (c) 214   (d) 236 
 
3.  Suppose you are Type A. During the trading period you sell one coupon at a price of 50 tokens 
and do not purchase any coupons. What are your Round Earnings? 
 
  (a) 25  (b) 75    (c) 200   (d) 264 
 
4.  Suppose you are Type B. During the trading period you sell one coupon at a price of 50 tokens 
and a second coupon at a price of 20 tokens. What are your Round Earnings? 
 
  (a) 70  (b) 189   (c) 159   (d) 229 
 
5.  Suppose you are Type A. During the trading period you sell one coupon at a price of 50 tokens 
and then are able to buy a coupon at a price of 20 tokens. What are your Round Earnings? 
 
  (a) 180  (b) 250   (c) 30    (d) 55 
 26 
 
Part 2 Instructions 
 
 
In Part 2 you will play three trials and each trial will be made up of five rounds. In each round 
you will make trades in the same way as you did in Part 1. There are, however, two differences. 
The first difference is that, at the beginning of each trial all six participants in your group will 
be Type A.  
 
The second difference is that each Type A participant will have the opportunity in each round to 
upgrade to Type B. The cost to upgrade to Type B is 400 tokens. If you choose to upgrade you 
will be Type B for the remaining rounds of the trial and will only pay the upgrade cost once. For 
example, if you choose to upgrade in round 2 you will pay 400 tokens in round 2 only and will 
be Type B for rounds 2 – 5. The upgrade decision screen is shown in Figure 4 below. 
Figure 4 
 
You will have up to 30 seconds in which to make your upgrade decision prior to each trading 
round. After making your upgrade decision you will see a screen that indicates the total number 
of Type A and Type B participants in your group.  
 
You will begin Part 2 by participating in one five-round practice trial that will not affect your 
earnings. After completing the practice trial, you will then play three five-round trials for real 
money. Groups will be randomly reshuffled prior to the beginning of each trial.  
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If your cumulative earnings fall below 0 tokens you will be excused from the remainder of the 






  At the beginning of each trial, all participants will be Type A. 
  In each round, Type A participants will have the opportunity to pay 400 tokens to upgrade to 
Type B. 
  If you upgrade to Type B, you will be Type B for the remaining rounds of the trial. 
  You will play 1 practice trial and then 3 actual 5-round trials for real money. 
 